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abstract
Generally speaking, ritual reversals mean switching to the opposite of what 
is considered ‘the normal order’. Such reversals can occur, for example, in 
terms of social hierarchies in rites of passage, in action in carnival, or in 
the framing of action as ritual or performance. For comedic figures such 
as clowns and tricksters, reversals are part of their semiotic technique. 
By ‘reversible reversals’ I refer to the characteristic ambiguity of comedic 
performance and the ability of comedic figures to play with, combine, or shift 
between opposite traits, actions, and perspectives. In this sense, comedy 
can be said to constitute a series of reversals. Jokes can also be reversible 
in the way their outcomes are indeterminate: they may have a number of 
interpretations and effects but none are guaranteed. To illustrate this, I will 
demonstrate how reversals figure in organizing jokes and performance 
in a bit called ‘Picking People to Hate’ by stand-up comedian Louis C.K. 
Looking at comedic performance as reversible reversals is a way to show 
how humor can be efficacious and meaningful both in spite and because 
of its characteristic ambiguity. This will illuminate how stand-up comedy 
creatively engages its cultural grounds and show how the study of comedic 
performance can offer insights into the semiotics of performance more 
broadly.
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INTRODUCTION: 
REVERSIBLE REVERSALS AND 
PERSPECTIVES AS fRAMES1
Reversals, broadly defined as switching to the 
opposite of what is considered ‘the normal order’ 
or inverting some aspect of it, are an important 
part of many ritual and other performances. 
Reversals of social and symbolic structures are 
also a vast and classic topic in anthropology (see 
for example Babcock 1978). Ritual reversals can 
occur, for example, in terms of social hierarchies 
in rites of passage, when a person is first lowered, 
possibly below the ‘status ladder’, before being 
elevated (e.g., Turner 1969), or in action in 
carnival when an entire system of social statuses 
may be reversed (e.g., Bakhtin 1984; Handelman 
1990). Reversals are an important aspect of 
the performance of many ritual clown figures 
(Keisalo-Galvan 2011; Steward 1991 [1929]) as 
well as more everyday instances of clowning and 
humor (e.g., Basso 1979). Reversals can also be 
a way of framing action as performance, ritual, 
or comedy, or a combination of these. 
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The concept of framing has been 
central to the discussion of play and humor: 
Gregory Bateson (1976) has discussed how 
metacommunicative messages mark something 
as play; actions within the ‘play frame’ are not to 
be received in the same way as the same actions 
when framed as serious. His example is a dog 
nipping at another dog in play—while the play 
bite iconically resembles a real bite, it is not to 
be interpreted the same way. Similarly, close 
friends playfully insulting each other are not 
interpreting these insults as ‘serious’. William 
Beeman describes one way of creating humor 
as presenting first one ostensible frame and 
then ‘pulling it aside’ to reveal another, which 
reframes the material (Beeman 2001). However, 
Don Handelman (2012) has argued that 
Bateson’s model of framing is hierarchical: the 
frame determines the meaning within the frame, 
and is in this sense both superior to the material 
it frames and separate from its ‘sides’—both 
what is within the frame and what is outside 
it. Handelman posits the idea that framing can 
also be conceived of in alternative ways: instead 
of viewing meta-organization as neat and linear, 
framing may be messy or fuzzy. Handelman 
uses the term ‘moebius framing’, inspired by the 
moebius strip, to describe a situation where the 
separation of inside, outside, frame, content, and 
wider context are not always clear.
Play-frames can certainly be vulnerable 
and ambiguous; it is easy for a joke to go ‘too 
far’ or even a play-fight between dogs to become 
too rough. The frame can be compromised 
by the content without the intention of the 
participants. Joking is ‘dangerous’ (Basso 1979: 
43). In this article I will explore the complex 
relations between the various frames in a bit 
of stand-up comedy and how this complexity 
is created and manipulated for comedic effect. 
For the purposes of this article, I will focus 
on perspectives as frames. This view is directly 
inspired by the material under analysis, as 
subjective intents and interpretations—and 
the way these are implicit, explicit, or revealed 
at strategic points—are central to the bit under 
analysis, and, I suggest, to stand-up comedy 
more generally. Linking frames to specific 
perspectives is also a way to analytically organize 
the plurality of frames involved in the material 
analytically, and to demonstrate the relations 
between frame and content. 
Performance techniques, as well as the skill 
of particular performers in employing these 
techniques, are a way of channeling and directing 
the perceptions and attention of participants. 
By using the concept of ‘semiotic technique’ 
I aim to draw attention to comedic performance 
as ‘a performative pragmatic accomplishment’ 
(Beeman 2001: 98), a skill embedded in social 
and communicative contexts to bring about 
certain effects, or, for the purposes of the current 
argument, to effectively transmit perspectives 
effectively. I am interested in how humor and 
its effects are semiotically created in relation 
to (aligned with, challenging, building on, and/
or subverting) semiotic ideologies, understood 
as ‘sign users’: reflexive sensibilities about 
the definition, value, and effects of different 
semiotic systems they use (Stasch 2011: 168; 
see also Keane 2007; Robbins 2012). Thus, 
I take semiotic technique to be inclusive of the 
performer’s action and the interpretive frames 
projected by that action and assumed as part 
of the knowledge and expectation of those 
receiving, watching, or otherwise participating 
in the performance.2 
By ‘reversible reversals’ I refer to both 
the characteristic ambiguity of comedic 
performance, and how comedic performance 
and this ambiguity are created in the first place. 
In this sense, reversible reversals figure in both 
the means and ends of comedic performance, 
the ability of comedic figures and jokes to 
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play with, combine, or shift between opposite 
concepts, traits, actions, and symbolic frames. 
Comedy can be said to constitute and be 
constituted by a series of reversals, which set 
up mutually defined opposites and relate them 
to each other. Bringing my ideas of semiotic 
technique and reversible reversals together 
with figure-ground theory and Handelman’s 
idea of moebius framing—and demonstrating 
these through a specific example—will show 
how comedic performance is both open and 
systematic and able to play with and subvert 
even its own grounding contexts. More broadly, 
this article is a step towards my eventual goal: 
to build on previous research to rethink the 
semiotics of comedic performance, with the 
hope of offering new insights on non-comedic 
performance as well.
LOUIS C.K.: ‘PICKING PEOPLE 
TO HATE’
Louis Szekely (born 1967), known as Louis 
C.K., is a renowned U.S. stand-up comedian 
‘commonly acknowledged as one of the greatest 
comics of his generation’ as an interviewer 
on NPR put it (Gross 2014). Louis’s style 
is observational; he talks about his own life, 
himself as a person, and describes his view of 
the world through commentary and description 
of mostly everyday events. Although there is 
a lot of talk about anger, violence, and conflict, 
to me Louis comes across as a basically kind and 
intelligent man. He bares his own shortcomings 
and peculiarities, and those of other people and 
the world, in a ruthlessly honest way, combining 
dark thoughts with lightheartedness. Louis is 
not quite as political as, for example, comedians 
Bill Hicks or George Carlin were, but he 
does often address social issues, such as white 
privilege, in a way that does not allow them to 
be simply laughed away. 
... and I don’t mean to say that if you’re 
white you have no right to complain. 
I just mean that if you’re black you have 
more right to complain... White people, 
we have the same thing, we have things 
that happened to us that we’re still coping 
with—like when they took our slaves 
away. (Live at Carnegie Hall, The Right to 
Complain)
Picking People to Hate—the bit I have chosen to 
analyze is from the 2007 HBO Special called 
Shameless. This bit features a clear example 
of reversals, as well as being representative of 
Louis’s style. The specials are filmed as shows 
with a live audience, but they are of course 
edited. In this sense the film is a finished 
product, the creation of Louis, the director, and 
the editor, rather than solely a document of a live 
performance. The process of making Shameless 
was the first implementation of Louis’s process 
of beginning with new material and building 
the show on a tour (Maron 2010). Although 
Louis is known for producing new material at 
a fast rate, there is a continuity of style in his 
performances, and there are echoes of previous 
ideas in Shameless. For example the basic 
premise of Picking People to Hate is mentioned 
in passing in Shitty Kids in Live in Houston. 
Picking People to Hate is the 6th of 15 bits. 
On the audio album these have been numbered 
and titled; there is the intro and outro, and 
thirteen titled bits in between. The shortest one 
is 27 seconds and the longest is 8.40 minutes. 
Picking People to Hate lasts 6.32 minutes. While 
the entire show is a coherent whole, each bit 
as it has been individualized on the album 
is complete in itself. Analyzing a single bit is 
a way to both show the complexity of even 
a short clip of performance and to demonstrate 
the key elements repeated in other bits and 
performances. 
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This particular one begins and ends with 
reference to a t-shirt that says ‘awesome possum’ 
and has a picture of an opossum. In between 
mentions of the shirt, Louis discusses various 
places like coffee shops and the post office, and 
the hatred he feels of people there, whether 
because they seem too free to Louis, or because 
he is indulging in ‘recreational hatred’ to pass 
the time while waiting in line.3 
ORGANIzING THROUGH 
REVERSALS 
There are various reversals in the bit, most 
of which are linked to shifts in perspective—
either in the way that Louis takes on another’s 
perspective or expresses a shift in his own. These 
perspectives and shifting between them inform 
and frame the content of Louis’s performance. 
Although at first these perspectives may seem 
to be organized hierarchically, the reversals 
ultimately challenge this hierarchy and 
undermine any conception of neat and orderly 
separation between the frames or between 
frame and content. Louis presents, takes on, 
and speaks from a total of twelve perspectives, 
each attached to a specific subject, including 
Louis as the narrator, Louis as the person 
experiencing the stories enacted in performance, 
various people who figure in the stories, and a 
thong swimsuit. Some only appear once, others 
several times. Louis goes back and forth, always 
returning to Louis the narrator. The performance 
is dialogic in various senses: impersonations 
and shifts are marked and created through a 
heteroglossic drawing from varieties of speech 
and multimodal expression including different 
ways of speaking and moving (see Bakhtin 1981; 
Haviland 2009). Louis’s semiotic technique 
is evident in how smoothly he impersonates, 
transmits, shifts between, and organizes the 
relations between these perspectives. 
The bit begins with Louis telling us about 
a t-shirt he has:
So. Here’s a weird thing that happened to 
me. I have this, I have this, uh, t-shirt and 
it says ‘awesome possum’ on it and it’s got a 
picture of a possum. I know it’s stupid but 
a friend of mine gave it to me and—fuck 
you, I bought it, I thought it was cool…
Here is the first reversal. Louis, first as the 
friendly and sociable narrator, the host to his 
audience, begins to acknowledge the silliness 
of the shirt and panders to the possibility of 
being judged by the audience, hiding behind the 
excuse that the shirt was actually a gift. He then 
abruptly changes his mind and tone of voice, 
defending and committing to his shirt and his 
fondness for it, despite and against the imagined 
judgment. Louis then continues:
But… I’ve never seen anybody with the 
same shirt before—with the awesome 
possum shirt—and I was in this coffee 
place in L.A. You know like a coffee—not 
like Starbucks… like an indie coffee place, 
where all the cool people go…
Louis then mimes the cool people drinking 
coffee, making tight nasal ooh-sounds to 
depict the cool people’s discourse. He paints 
a picture of hipsters (without using the word), 
noting how they wear snow hats in the summer, 
have ipods, and say ‘cool things like “me too”’, 
which of course can only be thought to be cool 
from an insider’s perspective as a response to 
something, and to a critical outsider (such 
as Louis here) might mean these people are 
insular and exactly alike—or indicate and affirm 
his outsiderhood. The bit goes on to present 
scenes at Venice Beach, the bank, and the post 
office, until we finally return to the coffee shop 
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and the awesome possum t-shirt at the end of 
the bit. In my view, the most important kind 
of reversal—and this is a constant in all his 
performance—is the repeated shifting between 
the two perspectives of Louis himself: narrator 
Louis engaging the audience and Louis as the 
individual experiencing all this, acted out in the 
scenes of the narrative. Through performance 
these are separated from and related to each 




To illustrate how reversals organize both 
content and its framing in comedic performance 
I also draw from the figure-ground theory 
of perception, which posits that perception 
and thought focus on figures (such as images, 
things, or abstract ideas), foregrounded against 
a ground (co(n)text(s), the sensual and intel-
ligible background). An important aspect of 
this view is ‘the fundamental asymmetry of the 
figure-ground relationship of focal event and its 
context’, which has also meant that figures have 
received ‘the lion’s share of analytic attention’ 
(Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 10; see also Hanks 
1992). Roy Wagner (1986: 25, 33 et passim) has 
taken the theory further by focusing on figure-
ground reversals: perception and cognition 
proceed through a dialectic between referential 
microcosmic codings, such as language, and 
relatively more concrete macrocosmic grounds, 
such as a coffee shop. This means that ‘a 
perception can be inverted with its perceptual 
“ground” [and] referential microcosm and 
embodied macrocosm can serve alternatively 
as figure and ground to one another’ (ibid.: 33). 
Perception is still focused on figures, but the 
reversibility of the relation shows how figures 
and grounds, such as talk about coffee shops and 
actual coffee shops, are relative to each other, 
each relying on the other for meaning. Figure-
ground pairings are temporary and unstable, 
dependent on culturally and socially informed 
perspectives and mutually coordinated semiotic 
action as a constant shifting and shuffling of 
figures and grounds. Framing is thus an aspect 
of defining the relation between figure and 
ground. Furthermore, I suggest that deliberate 
figure-ground reversals, allowing shifting 
between grounds and re-defining figures, are 
an integral part of comedic performance as 
a semiotic technique.
In Louis’s performance, the obvious, most 
immediate level of contextual ground for the 
telling of these stories is the time and place of 
the performance itself, now documented on film. 
The film is shot from several different angles and 
distances. We see the stage, Louis, the audience. 
The stage is almost empty; there is a stool 
with a bottle of water, the quintessential bit 
of backstage iconic of stand-up performances. 
There is Louis holding the microphone, wearing 
a black sweater and brown pants. There is 
a watch on his wrist. The scene is simple, yet 
it is so easy to be transported away by the 
performance.
Louis names and describes places and 
people in them, shifting between direct 
narration to the audience and acted out 
experiences within the stories. The shifts as 
well as the scenes are created through speech, 
expressions, movement, body, and voice (on the 
performative framing of various contexts nested 
in each other, see Bauman 1986). Louis creates 
various places, first as described figures we focus 
on and imagine, which then become grounds, to 
be inhabited by more specific figures and events. 
He goes back and forth between the narrator 
Louis, and Louis as the character in the story, at 
times taking on other characters.
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This is how Louis moves from the coffee 
shop to Venice beach and begins to broach the 
topic of hating people: 
 …and I just stand in the door way and 
fucking hate them—I don’t know why I go 
to the place I—I think it’s cause I hate them! 
I just hate this, I—there’s a certain part of 
the culture I just hate. Cause I grew up in 
Boston and in Boston people just beat the 
shit out of each other for no reason—they 
just beat the shit out of each other (…) but 
I kind of think you need that you know, to 
keep quality control, cause in places where 
that doesn’t happen people are just too 
free, and fucking—they’re just a bummer 
you know—like, I was once on Venice 
Beach and I’m jogging, and there’s this 
guy—roller blading towards me and he’s, 
he’s got roller blades on and just a thong, 
just a fucking thong that’s just grabbing 
his dick and balls, just fighting with them, 
going, ‘Grr, stay in there!’ and then he’s just 
totally naked otherwise and he’s got this 
Kenny G hair and he’s just rollerblading 
like [Louis mimes the movement] ‘I’m 
free!’ And I actually had to stop jogging 
cause I needed my whole body to fucking 
hate this guy with. I had to just stand 
there going oh, you motherfucker! Now 
I have to know you exist you piece of shit! 
Fucking go skate into an AIDS-tree, you 
motherfucker! [pause] All right now. Heh.
After the energetic swearing, understood as the 
silent thoughts going through Louis’s head in 
Venice Beach but acted out loud in performance, 
Louis tones it down as the narrator, saying, ‘all 
right now’, and giving a half laugh at this other 
version of himself, in coordination with the 
audience. Then Louis comes to the idea of the 
bit’s title: Picking People to Hate:
I dunno, I—I’ve started to kind of hate 
people and it’s not because I have anything 
against them it’s just I—I enjoy it, it’s just 
recreation, like you know when you’re at 
the bank and you got nothing to do while 
you’re waiting in line so you just pick 
people to hate while you’re waiting, you just 
look at someone and form an opinion, with 
no information, and it’s never positive, who 
fucking wastes their time—[shifts into an 
exaggeratedly earnest voice, covering the 
mic with his hand, as if to convey a voice in 
one’s mind] ‘I bet he’s a hard worker’ who 
thinks about that shit?
This is of course a reversal of how emotional 
reactions are usually supposed to work: as 
reactions. We are supposed to hate someone only 
because of a good reason, and it is supposed to 
be something to avoid, certainly not recreational. 
Louis gives two examples, the bank and 
the post office, as places where this sort of 
boring waiting in line can occur. Here, however, 
is a contrast between the two places; the bank 
is posited as more hypothetical: Louis stays in 
the present tense. When he posits a place as 
more defined, more of an actual place where 
the events took place, he tends to set this up by 
using the past tense: 
I feel people hate me sometimes, you know, 
like uh, I was at the post office and I’m at 
the line you know it’s one of those things 
where there’s a line and one window open, 
so everyone’s like ‘ohh!’
These sorts of stories are a common part of 
Louis’ stand up. He describes situations and 
places that are both generic enough and specific 
enough to imagine and to provide a (back)
ground for Louis to develop events from his 
perspective. After all it is this perspective that 
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Louis provides on the familiar events that allow 
us to see them in a new way, through Louis’ eyes, 
as it were. 
Now that the idea of hating strangers 
in public places has been established, it can 
be used as a ground to make sense of further 
figures. The post office, also a ground, becomes 
the scene of various happenings: Louis describes 
and demonstrates the collective frustration ‘like 
a silent movie of impatient people’. Then he 
describes the people who break the silence to say 
obvious things like, ‘they should open another 
window’, which Louis says in a slightly higher 
and tighter voice he often uses in performance 
to depict ‘stupid people’. Next Louis describes 
a slightly more defined character in the post 
office:
then there’s always an old lady who has 
a story: [in a slow and deliberate voice] 
“I was here on Wednesday, and there was 
also a line like this.” Holy shit! Really?! 
Ohh my god, you fucking old lady! That’s 
amazing!
Now the idea of hating people—first presented 
as Louis’ private fantasy—begins to take on 
a life of its own. From the beginning there is 
an ambiguity between Louis being part of the 
group and separated from it. He depicts the 
group response to the ‘they should open another 
window’ as equally sarcastic: ‘everyone’s like 
“totally”’. This ambiguity is resolved into a clear 
rift when Louis explicitly notes how hatred is 
focused on the one being served: 
But, anyway, then it’s your turn to the 
window, right, and now everybody’s 
looking at you and you feel the scrutiny 
of how quickly you’re mailing your shit. 
You start realizing how (…) unimportant 
your package is and you feel like they can 
tell—‘yeah get the fuck out of there you 
don’t need to mail that right now’ and it’s 
like if you do one little extra thing like, ‘uh, 
do you have those stamps that have Jackie 
Robinson’, behind you hear like ‘pfft, Jesus, 
fuucking duuude’ they put their shit down 
heavily like, ‘fuck! Now this motherfucker’s 
gonna make me stand here while he buys 
fucking stamps at the post office, are you 
shitting me? Let’s shit in his mouth right 
now, seriously, let’s you fucking hold him 
down and I will shit directly into his 
fucking time-wasting mouth’.
Louis goes to fairly extreme places of violence 
in this show. In an earlier bit in the same show 
(Tell Your Girlfriend I Said ) Louis takes a scene 
of imagined violence to a height where the story 
ends with Louis beating someone to death with 
a pipe (because of Louis-the-individual’s literal 
interpretation of a bumper sticker saying ‘tell 
your girlfriend I said thanks’) and masturbating 
on the corpse. Then Louis-the-narrator takes 
over and states that that was too much and 
unnecessary. 
Didn’t need that part, didn’t need it. The 
story was totally complete without the 
jerking off on the corpse—[half to himself ] 
it’s too late. 
This to me is even funnier because it is delivered 
as presenting the storyteller’s own view, not 
in reaction to condemnation by the audience 
(who are, in the final edited product, laughing, 
cheering, and clapping for nine seconds between 
the end of the story and Louis’ commentary). 
This does not need to be taken as condoning 
violence by either Louis or the audience. Part of 
why these jokes work for me, when told by Louis, 
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are his demeanor and overall comportment that 
suggest he is not actually a violent man: the 
reversals into violence are reversible. 
So Louis artfully creates grounds and 
figures, places, people in those places, the 
perspectives of and on these people, and we 
follow him from place to place and from one 
perspective to another. Actual and imagined 
interactions in the stories are contrasted 
and connected to the actual here-and-now 
engagement between Louis and the audience.
I argued earlier that semiotic technique 
is action in relation to semiotic ideology. This 
does not mean that the action is determined by 
the ideology, more so since linguistic and other 
ideologies themselves contain contradictions 
which skillful performance may exploit. In the 
ways comedic performance brings contradictory 
elements together, it often manages to both align 
itself with and subvert existing ideas, which is 
a central aspect of the potential semiotic force 
of humor. For example, Louis’s performance is 
both aligned with and opposed to the semiotic 
ideologies concerned with being a social person 
on the one hand and an autonomous individual 
on the other. The performance and the stories 
set up extremes of these and then find ways of 
relating them, mediating the boundary between 
them. 
Louis-the-narrator is the one addressing 
the audience in the here and now of the 
performance. Most of the time Louis as 
narrator engages with the audience in a sociable, 
professional manner, in accordance with the 
genre—yet this may shift, like in the beginning 
of the bit when Louis starts to pander to the 
presumed judgment of his shirt and then turns 
it around (of course, dealing with a heckler is 
a standard example of when a stand-up 
comedian shifts into a less sociable register). 
As narrator, he is often the voice of morality, 
commenting both on the story and himself 
within it. Louis-the-individual in the stories is 
different: he is apart from the other people in the 
stories, in conflict with them, usually concerned 
with what he wants or otherwise caught up in 
his own private, often socially inappropriate, 
thoughts. On the other hand, Louis-the-
individual is quick-to-react, spontaneous, and 
creative: he says things like ‘go skate into an 
AIDS-tree’ and conjures up imaginative events 
and relations. He is neither moral nor social. In 
fact, in the end of the bit when he tries to make 
a sociable connection, it doesn’t work. Louis the 
experiencing individual tries to step away from 
the hatred and the violent fantasies, to reverse 
this and have a nice social moment, but is met 
with an adverse reaction from the other person.
According to Roy Wagner (1981; see also 
Macfarlane 2008) the distinction between what 
is seen as the innate and given, and what is 
considered to be the sphere of human action and 
agency, can be conceptualized as what people 
are and what they do. Special circumstances 
(such as ritual) or special individuals (such as 
shamans or scientists), who have mastered the 
appropriate techniques to do so, can shift the 
boundary or invert these spheres, again, in 
terms of specific semiotic ideologies. Comedic 
performance as a context and as a semiotic 
technique provides one—perhaps mundane, but 
still efficacious—example of this kind of figure-
ground reversal of being and doing. Louis-the-
narrator is an individual, unique and different 
from other individuals, and he does the social and 
conventional, bridging the gap between himself 
and the people in the audience. The Louis in 
the stories in an inversal of this: he is actively 
showing his inner thoughts and bringing 
them out, spinning elaborate fantasies of these 
thoughts, full of violence and mockery, angry at 
how others impinge on him. The Louis in the 
stories as an individual is actively setting himself 
apart, doing and performing his individuality, 
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against the inescapable society (that he is part 
of ) which impedes Louis’ freedom, pushing 
him to assert himself. His inner individual self 
is presented and brought out, and Louis, as the 
social person relating to the audience, is (in) the 
(back)ground. 
The performance is a constant shifting 
back and forth between these. As the narration 
tells us, Louis may just be standing there at the 
door of the coffee shop, but in his thoughts he is 
powerful, judging and condemning others. 
… and I’m standing in the doorway just 
fantasizing about walking around just 
hitting their cups to the floor, like this, you 
know [mimes the action] fucking bagel, 
and coffee, and bagel...
Yet this fantasy of power, or the need for it, is 
partly created by the worry of being judged 
by the ‘cool people’. If Louis-the-individual 
is creative and, as such, a source of power, he 
is also anti-social, immoral, dangerous to the 
self-as-a-moral-project which, in addition 
to fulfilling the self, also aims to fit in with 
and relate to others. In one way, stand-up 
comedy performance, so predicated on the 
individual identity of the performer, provides 
a conventional frame for bringing out and 
engaging with these contradictions related to 
the individual self. If individual autonomy and 
the social collectivity are difficult to fit together, 
Louis presents a way to relate them without 
compromising their difference or glossing over 
their contradictions. If a plurality of values 
sometimes means that different values require 
different rituals (Robbins 2014), then Louis’s 
stand up meets this plurality and its conflicts 
head-on—and takes them all to extremes. 
REVERSIBLE REVERSALS 
I have discussed Picking People to Hate as a series 
of reversals and shifts. Louis as the story teller, 
the performer in front of us, goes back and 
forth between the visible, audible, and concrete, 
and the imagined, and takes us with him by 
drawing on a variety of repertoires, wielding his 
technique to conjure and transmit perspectives 
for us to look through. However, a different 
sort of reversal takes place at the end and wraps 
up Picking People to Hate; this is an example of 
a reversible reversal, which shows how reversals 
work on different levels of performance and 
how the comedian’s perspective can be seen as 
an example of ‘moebius-framing’.
 Louis brings us back to the cool people’s 
coffee shop—except now he calls them ‘the 
young people’ and there is a laugh and a feel 
of the truth coming out. A new character is 
brought out: a ‘young guy’—and he’s wearing 
an awesome possum shirt! Louis describes and 
performs the happiness and excitement this 
makes him feel and how he gestures, pointing 
back and forth to the guy’s shirt and his own 
and says, ‘Hey, nice shirt!’ But the young guy 
rebuffs Louis and walks away. Louis is enraged. 
While this is a culmination of the topic, hating 
people, there is also a difference in that it goes 
beyond the ‘picking someone to hate with no 
information’. The conflict is now real, and all of 
Louis’s hostile fantasies of being cut off from 
the group seem warranted. 
Yet in the middle of this climax of anger, 
Louis looks down and realizes: he is not 
wearing the shirt. Suddenly we see Louis and 
his actions in a new light, reframed through 
the now-revealed perspective of the young guy. 
But we can still see Louis’s perspective, too; it 
is not reducible to the new perspective. The 
end is a combination of opposed perspectives. 
It brings together Louis-as-narrator and 
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Louis-the-individual. It also brings together 
the real and the imagined, firstly in that this is 
presented as a real story, and secondly in that the 
audience has been led to see the events as Louis 
did in this—possibly, supposedly, real moment—
and then brought to the realization that they 
have indeed been tricked in the performance 
here-and-now.4 
Louis repeats the ‘Hey, nice shirt’ gesture, 
now caricaturing it as something senseless, 
ridiculous, or wrong since the shirt is not 
actually present. Louis makes fun of himself 
and the hatred is dissolved, the conflict revealed 
as (at least possibly) a simple misunderstanding. 
The perspective of Louis’s Other, the young guy, 
has also been reframed and shown to have its 
own motivation, it is not just an extension of 
Louis—which, of course, it really is, when we 
remember who is telling us these stories. But 
such is Louis’s skill that he has obviated his 
own perspective as the main frame, and given 
us several, held in a balance, related but still 
distinctly different. If the audience is tricked, 
this is a recreation of how Louis himself was 
tricked, how his own perspective was turned 
around and his authority (in all senses of the 
word) revealed as fallible.
Specifically, this final reversal is reversible 
in the sense that we are now able to shift back 
and forth between these perspectives/frames. 
Louis’s perspective (on the world and his place 
in it) that the entire bit up till now has been 
setting up, is the ground for interpreting the 
figure of ‘the young guy’s’ reaction, his scorn 
for ‘the old guy’. The consequent figure-ground 
reversal, this scorn taken as a ground, even 
has the power to change Louis’s perception of 
himself as a figure: 
Why does he have to make me feel like 
an old fag just ‘cause I want to make 
a connection with another human being!
Having failed in the real world of other people, 
Louis retreats into the fantasies of hatred, back 
into his own mind. Then Louis’s perspective 
opens up (when he literally shifts his view and 
looks down) to see that there is no shirt—this 
absence is a new figure with both the previous 
perspectives as ground. Then the shirt’s absence 
is added to the ground based on which we 
understand the guy’s reaction as figure in 
a new light. Yet we have not lost Louis’s previous 
perspective, grounded in the assumption that 
he is wearing the shirt. We now have two 
perspectives placed in a reversible figure-ground 
relation; we are aware of two contradictory yet 
both reasonable reactions, and between them 
a whole range of possibility. 
Since the events of the story are at all 
times explicitly mediated by a subjective 
perspective, and all these perspectives are, in 
fact, represented by Louis, ‘moebius-framing’ 
provides an apt metaphor to describe this. The 
reversal of perspectives is like the twist of the 
moebius strip, and ‘Louis-as-frame’ is not 
actually separable from the content, nor from the 
‘other side’ of Louis-as-frame, the surrounding 
(social) world of beaches, post offices, and coffee 




I have given a detailed description of Picking 
People to Hate to show how reversals organize 
this particular bit of comedic performance 
on several interrelated levels of content and 
framing. Reversals work to make the stories 
funny, meaningful, and intelligible, to transport 
us from the theater into the stories and back 
again, and to create the actual here-and-
now engagement between the audience and 
performer as both spontaneous and social—and 
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also reflexive, meaningful, and efficacious as 
skillful performance. These patterns could 
also be explored to see how they are used to 
create Louis’s individual style as a comedian 
or, by adding data from other performers and 
shows, how the genre of stand-up itself and its 
emphasis on (at least the appearance) of real 
selves, truths, and connections is created, as well 
as how the material is organized in a way to 
make it comedic.
I will now attempt to draw together 
some of the potential meanings and efficacies 
of Picking People to Hate and relate them to 
the ambiguities. This is related to the bigger 
question of how and if humor can be efficacious 
in spite of and because of its ambiguity. Doing 
things—creating or making something real, 
or effecting some systematic transformation 
through semiotic action—is a central concern 
in studies of ritual and performance (e.g., 
Handelman 1990; Kapferer 2004; Stasch 
2011; Turner 1967). These views bring out the 
‘world-making’ capacity of performances, going 
beyond reductive analyses that would see them 
as ‘nonreal portrayal of preexisting real entities’ 
(Stasch 2011: 163).
A review of the anthropological literature 
on the meaning and efficacy of humor and 
clowning is beyond the scope of this article.5 
For the purposes of the current argument, 
I will limit my discussion to a few remarks on 
how the efficacy of comedic performance has 
been analyzed in relation to its ambiguity, and 
the ‘unperformative’ capacity to undo things 
specifically attributed to comedic figures. 
Humor has a history of being overlooked 
in favor of more serious topics of study and 
discussion. Even a fairly recent study dedicated 
to speech play and verbal art (Sherzer 2002: 5, 
153–154) makes a distinction between speech 
play and ‘referential, transactional speech’, 
claiming speech play to be ‘time out and time 
off ’ from the seriousness of life, or ‘grease and oil 
for referential transactions’ in Western societies. 
It is perhaps this surprisingly persistent view of 
humor as not quite important that has led some 
scholars to attempt to unravel the ambiguity 
by focusing their analytic explanations on the 
‘serious’, critical, or transgressive implications 
of the comedic figures and performances (e.g., 
Basso 1979; King 1977; Makarius 1970). Others, 
however, have found the potential for comedic 
power in the deconstructive, unstabilizing, or 
de-formative aspects of the clown (e.g., Babcock 
1984; Hieb 1972; Handelman 1990). Mary 
Douglas (1968) refers to jokes as ‘anti-rites’ and 
notes how the classic idea of the cathartic effect 
of humor (discussed by, e.g., Bergson 1911) 
can be specifically used within ritual processes 
as an agent of purification (see also Macintyre 
1992 for an example of comedy in mourning 
rituals). In these cases, the clowning can reverse 
the effects of previous stages of the ritual in 
question. 
I argue that an analysis that would 
demonstrate how the potential efficacy of 
comedic performance is achieved– whether 
within the dynamics of a given event or in social 
and cultural contexts beyond the event—needs 
to consider the semiotic elements and relations 
more thoroughly than has been done in previous 
studies, and a view of comedic performance as 
reversible reversals provides a way to do this. In 
the case of the Chapayeka ritual clowns, who 
represent Judas in the Yaqui Easter ritual, the 
dialectical mediation of opposites is what makes 
their performance efficacious. This happens in 
different ways on different levels: one side or 
aspect of their performance is opposed to the 
ritual in a way that threatens to compromise, 
even undo, the frame that construes the ritual as 
a special sphere of meaning, while the other side 
is the faithful recreation of the conventional 
ritual forms. The Chapayeka performance shifts 
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between these, and finally, it is the relation 
between these opposed modes of performance 
that is an important part of sustaining the 
continuity of the ritual as meaningful and 
efficacious in recreating cosmology and culture 
as contexts of being. (Keisalo-Galvan 2011, see 
also Keisalo 2014b).
How is Louis’s bit meaningful and 
efficacious in spite and because of ambiguity? 
There are various kinds of ambiguity in Louis’s 
performance. There is incongruity of morals and 
values, the opposed ideological expectations and 
aspects of being a self-actualized individual in 
polite modern society. One example of a fertile 
element of ambiguity is the awesome possum 
tee-shirt. It exists and yet is absent, unusual 
enough to suggest a connection based on taste 
between the individuals who choose to wear it, 
or alternatively an index of coolness that comes 
with an age-limit that marks divisions between 
social groups. Louis skillfully weaves all these 
elements into a coherent and balanced pattern 
that is in itself both open and systematic: any 
perspective or interpretive point of entry we 
choose, we are also presented with its opposite 
counterpart (see Wagner 1992). The ambiguity 
is handled in such a way that there is no 
absolute resolution, no final reduction to one 
point of reference or view. In an interview in 
GQ Magazine (Corsello 2014), Louis says that 
a good joke is an ‘epistemological problem’ that 
one gets ‘trapped’ in. This is what makes it last 
as something to think about and with.
One apparently simple yet actually very 
complex aspect of comedic efficacy is the 
emotional one of making people laugh—all 
the more remarkable when this is programmed 
to happen at a prescribed venue, at a set time, 
in a gathering of strangers. Of course, the 
spectator’s emotional engagement—if it 
happens at all—with Picking People to Hate can 
take various forms, from living out the entire 
bit to work out his or her own feelings of anger, 
shame, or fear, to feeling vicarious pleasure in 
Louis’s expressions of anger, or observing the 
stories at a distance, as something funny that 
happens to Louis. As for Louis, this bit is an 
example of how the comedian gets to be both 
subject and object, ground and figure, working 
through and presenting his perspective, offering 
it for others to see through, as well as facing 
others’ (including the audiences’) perspectives 
on himself. In terms of comedy’s semiotic 
technique as a creative engagement with the 
cultural grounds of performance, the reversible 
reversals of Picking People to Hate allow Louis 
to achieve something of a miracle, or at least 
a workable paradox: he gets to both hold up 
a moral standard and fail at it, while still 
avoiding hypocrisy and shame. 
NOTES
1 I first discussed the idea of ‘reversible reversals’ 
in comedic performance in a presentation in 
the ritual symposium organized at the Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies by Joel Robbins 
and Johanna Sumiala. I thank them and the other 
participants at the symposium. A presentation 
of a draft of this paper was given at the Social 
and Cultural Anthropology visiting seminar 
at the University of Helsinki, and I thank the 
participants for many helpful comments and 
a chance to think through these ideas. I also 
thank Harri Siikala for reading previous drafts of 
the article, as well as the anonymous reviewer.
2 How the audience influences and shapes the 
performance and its outcome is of course a very 
important question in stand-up comedy as in any 
performance. However, exploring this relation 
would require not only a longer discussion 
but more and different data, as I am basing 
my current analysis on a filmed performance, 
where the interaction between the audience 
and performer is in this sense entextualized, 
and may have been modified by editing. For 
this reason I will limit my discussion of the 
audience to only a few passing remarks. I also 
want to emphasize that the anthropological 
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study of performance requires ethnography and 
a variety of data in addition to recordings of 
performances. This article is part of my on-going 
project of developing a semiotic anthropology 
of comedic performance, also including data on 
stand-up comedy collected through ethnographic 
fieldwork. However, the clip I am analyzing here 
does provide an excellent example of  ‘reversible 
reversals’, so in this specific case I feel that an 
analysis of a recorded example of a genre is 
justified. 
3 Picking People to Hate can be found on Youtube 
with the key words ‘awesome possum’.
4 Though stand-up audiences generally know better 
than to take everything as face-value, honest 
communication, (see Raskin 1985 on humor 
as cooperative non-bona-fide communication) 
especially Louis-as-narrator gets the benefit 
of the doubt, and much of what he says is 
interpreted according to Grice’s (1975) maxims: 
the expectation of providing the appropriate 
amount of information in the interest of 
conversational cooperation—and there is a 
reward for doing this, as getting tricked is part 
of the show and the fun. Although many things 
Louis mentions are presented as actual moments 
and linked to real things, part of the conventions 
of the genre is telling stories and claiming they 
happened ‘today’ or for real, regardless of whether 
they did or not. Louis also plays with this, as in 
an earlier bit of Shameless when he says, ‘… I was 
in a bar, doesn’t matter where, because I’m lying’.  
5 For a discussion on studies of ritual clowning 
see Keisalo-Galvan 2011, for a brief discussion 
of the anthropology of humor see Keisalo 2014a 
(also Mitchell 1992). For an overview of humor 
studies in a variety of disciplines, see Raskin 2008. 
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